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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Judgment dated January 24, 1991, of the Fifth Judicial District Court of
Washington County, Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, that is the subject of
this appeal is not within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)0"). A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as Appendix
A (R. 237-238).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
May a Chapter 7 debtor compel performance of a nondebtor under a contract that
has been rejected pursuant to the provisions of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code?
The trial court's legal conclusion - that the contract terminated by operation of
law and may not be enforced against either party - did not resolve any issues of fact and
may be reviewed by this Court for correctness. Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811
P. 2d 174 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Resolution of this appeal rests upon the Court's interpretation of Section 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §101 et seq.). A copy of Section 365 is attached to this
brief as Appendix B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. H. LeRoy Cobabe ("Cobabe") commenced this action to
enforce the provisions of an Agreement for Consulting Services. (R. 1-7) Garth Stanger
and Edward Stanger (the "Stangers") answered the complaint, denying liability under the
contract and counterclaiming for amounts paid to Cobabe. (R. 9-27).
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. Pursuant to a Motion
for Summary Judgment dated August 31, 1991, Cobabe sought summary judgment on his
contract claim against the Stangers.

(R. 34-35).

Pursuant to a motion dated

September 26, 1991 the Stangers sought summary judgment on the same claim and on
their counterclaim (R. 107-109). Argument on the cross motions for summary judgment
was heard by Judge Eves on October 18, 1990. (R. 225). On November 2, 1990 Judge
Eves entered his Memorandum Decision granting the Stangers' motion for summary
judgment and denying Cobabe's motion.

(R. 226-234).

A copy of Judge Eves'

Memorandum Decision is attached to this brief as Appendix C. Judgment was thereafter
entered in favor of the Stangers. (R. 237-238).
Statement of Facts.1 Cobabe filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah
on November 1, 1989 (the "Petition Date"). (R. 30, 112).
!

The Stangers object to and otherwise dispute paragraphs 6 through 15 (with the
exception of Cobabe's admission in paragraph 15 that he received $20,000.00 from the
Stangers after November 1, 1989) of Cobabe's Statement of Facts. The statements
contained therein are an attempt by Cobabe to rehash bankruptcy court proceedings that
have no relationship to the issue on appeal for the following reasons: 1) the legal issue
of whether rejection of the contract barred Cobabe's efforts to enforce its terms against
the Stangers was never raised by the parties nor decided by the bankruptcy court; and
2) the January 5, 1990 order of the bankruptcy court, any related findings of fact or
conclusions of law and any orders issued subsequent thereto have been vacated and are
of no further force and effect. (R. 19-27).
2

As of the Petition Date Cobabe and the Stangers were parties to the Agreement
for Consulting Services dated April 26, 1988 (the "Agreement"). (R. 1-7 and R. 9-27).
Neither Cobabe nor his bankruptcy trustee assumed the Agreement within sixty days after
the Petition Date or at any time thereafter.

(R. 30, 113 and R. 130, H5).

The Stangers paid to Cobabe all sums required by the Agreement up to the
Petition Date.

(R. 129). Cobabe has performed no services for the Stangers at any

time following the Petition Date. (R. 130).
During the course of Cobabe's bankruptcy case the Stangers paid him $20,000.00
pursuant to an order of the bankruptcy court. (R. 31, 115). The bankruptcy court order
was subsequently vacated by stipulation of the parties and is of no further force and
effect. (R. 22-27 and R. 31, 116). Notwithstanding vacation of the order Cobabe refused
to return the $20,000.00 to the Stangers. (R. 31, 117).
Cobabe received a bankruptcy discharge of all his obligations on February 20,
1990. (R. 124).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Cobabe filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case in order to obtain a discharge of his
liabilities and obligations. Upon filing, a trustee was appointed for Cobabe's bankruptcy
estate and Cobabe's rights with respect to the Agreement were governed by the
provisions of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. That statute contains provisions and
conditions, the fulfillment of which would have allowed Cobabe to obtain the benefit of
his interest in the Agreement while protecting the interests of the Stangers.

Having

failed to comply with the statutory conditions precedent to assumption and assignment
of the Agreement, Cobabe may not now attempt to enforce its terms against the
3

Stangers. Additionally, case law addressing the effect of rejection of executory contracts
supports the lower court's determination that rejection of the Agreement resulted in a
breach sufficient to bar enforcement of the contract against the Stangers.

ARGUMENT
I.
COBABE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE BANKRUPTCY STATUTE
BARS HIS PRESENT ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE
STANGERS.
The effect of Cobabe's bankruptcy filing on the Agreement and, consequently, the
impact of the bankruptcy on Cobabe's ability to enforce the Agreement is determined
by reference to Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a copy of which is attached to this
brief as Appendix B. A threshold issue in an analysis of Section 365 is the determination of whether the Agreement is an executory contract. The parties agree that the
Agreement is an executory contract within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.2
2

The Senate Report contained in the legislative history of Section 365 states:
Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are
executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides.

S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978,
pp. 5787, 5844, 6303. As recognized by at least one court that applied the definition
contained in this legislative history:
This loose, non-specific definition is basically an adoption of
a definition announced first by Professor Countryman, which
he stated defining executory contracts as follows:
[A] contract under which the obligation of both
the bankrupt and the other party to the contract
are so far unperformed that the failure of either
to complete the performance would constitute a
4

(Cobabe Brief, p. 10 n. 1). Section 365, dealing with executory contracts, contains the
exclusive statutory statement of the rights of both the debtor and nondebtor with respect
to executory contracts. In re Sweetwater, 40 B.R. 733, 742 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984). Thus,
the provisions of Section 365, and judicial decisions interpreting that statute, control the
question of enforceability of the Agreement following Cobabe's bankruptcy.
The statute itself provides a clear framework outlining Cobabe's rights and
obligations with respect to the Agreement. When Cobabe filed his petition for relief
under Chapter 7 a trustee was appointed to administer his bankruptcy estate.3 Cobabe's
trustee was empowered to assume or reject any executory contract to which Cobabe was
a party. Section 365(a). Had Cobabe's trustee acted to assume the Agreement he would
first have been required to cure any existing default and compensate the Stangers for any
actual pecuniary loss resulting from such default. Section 365(b)(1). Thus, an attempt
by Cobabe's trustee to assume the Agreement would have required the trustee to address
any defaults under the Agreement, including the provision of paragraph 6 of the
Agreement whereby Cobabe agreed to indemnify the Stangers from any and all tax
liabilities arising from the sale of the auto dealership. (R. 6, 116). Cobabe's bankruptcy
trustee made no effort to assume the Agreement. If the trustee in a Chapter 7 case
does not assume or reject an executory contract within 60 days after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, the contract is rejected. Section 365(d)(1). The failure of Cobabe's

material breach excusing the performance of the
other.
In re Learning Publications, Inc., 94 B.R. 763, 764 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
3

11 U.S.C. §701 et seq. Had Cobabe chosen to file a reorganization case under
Chapter 11 he would have had, as a debtor in possession, all of the rights and duties of
a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §1106.
5

trustee to assume the Agreement resulted in its rejection by operation of law. Once
rejected, the Agreement can never be assumed.

The rejection of the Agreement

constituted a breach of the Agreement effective immediately before the date of the filing
of the Chapter 7 petition. Section 365(g)(1).
Cobabe's present effort to avail himself of the benefits of the Agreement is
nothing more than an end run on the protections afforded the Stangers under the
bankruptcy statute. Contrary to his assertions, Cobabe had complete control over the
course of events in this matter.

Initially, it was his choice to file a liquidation

bankruptcy case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than a reorganization
case under Chapter 11. Had he decided to file a Chapter 11 case it would have been
his decision, as the debtor in possession, whether to assume or reject the Agreement.
Conceivably, Cobabe could have assumed the Agreement for the benefit of his creditors
after first complying with the default cure provisions of Section 365(b)(1) protecting the
pecuniary interests of the Stangers. Instead, Cobabe chose to file a Chapter 7 case and
leave the matter in the hands of an independent trustee. Even then, Cobabe was not
cut off from a course of action that could have attained his stated objective - realization
of the benefits of the Agreement. However, Cobabe chose to ignore the provisions of
Section 365 protecting the interests of the Stangers and instead filed suit to enforce the
Agreement after receiving his bankruptcy discharge.

Allowing Cobabe to obtain a

discharge of his obligations under the contract, while at the same time permitting him
to compel the Stangers' performance under that same contract would offend basic
principals of equity and mutuality of obligation. In re Executive Technology Data Systems,
79 B.R. 276 (Bankr. E.D. Mi. 1987).

6

Cobabe's argument that personal service contracts pass through Chapter 7
bankruptcy cases unaffected rests upon some fundamental misconceptions. First, Section
365(a) permits a trustee to assume or reject any executory contract.

Section 365(c)

simply adds the limitation that a trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract
for personal services unless the parties to the contract consent. In the Matter of James
Taylor, 913 F.2d. 102, 106 (3rd Cir. 1990). Thus, Cobabe's trustee could have assumed
the Agreement (subject to the default cure provisions of Section 365(b)(1)) and assigned
the contract to Cobabe with the consent of the Stangers. Obviously, a bankruptcy trustee
would not enter into such a transaction unless there would be a resulting benefit to the
bankruptcy estate. Such benefit might have come in the form of payments from Cobabe
to the estate in consideration for assumption and assignment of the Agreement.
However, Cobabe chose not to induce his trustee to assume the contract with the result
that the Agreement was automatically rejected and breached pursuant to the statute.
Personal services contracts therefore differ from other executory contracts only in that
the consent of the nondebtor is required before the trustee has authority to assume
them.

On the other hand, the trustee's authority to reject extends to all executory

contracts - including personal services contracts. Taylor, 913 F.2d. at 107. In Taylor the
3rd Circuit expressly rejected the notion that a bankruptcy trustee lacks power to deal
with personal service contracts.
The bankruptcy statute provides a clear framework by which Cobabe could have
obtained the benefits of the Agreement,. Complying with the statute would have required
the trustee and Cobabe to protect the interests of the Stangers and obtain their consent
prior to assumption and assignment. Having failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 365, Cobabe may not now enforce the Agreement against the Stangers.
7

II.
UNDER CASE LAW IMPLEMENTING SECTION 365 COBABE MAY NOT
COMPEL THE STANGERS' PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING REJECTION AND
BREACH OF THE CONTRACT.
Cobabe's basic premise is that the federal judiciary is "confused" about the law
regarding executory contracts. (Cobabe Brief, p. 13). He asserts that the rights of the
parties to the contract are unaffected following rejection. Rejection, however, does not
merely free the debtor to enforce the contract at his will. Rather it acts to terminate
the contract and render it unenforceable by either party.

The lower court properly

declined to accept Cobabe's novel interpretation of Section 365 in the face of extensive
case law to the contrary.
Although this Court has never addressed the question presently before it, there
is other pertinent authority. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals took the opportunity to
discuss the effect of rejection on executory contracts in In re Pacific Express, Inc., 780
F. 2d. 1482 (9th Cir. 1986). In response to the creditor's argument on appeal that the
debtor had failed to assume an executory contract with the creditor, the court stated as
follows:
Generally, the bankruptcy court may order the bankrupt's
estate either to assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease, subject to its approval. 11 U.S.C. §365(d)(2).
Assumption assures the continuation in force of the contract
or lease. However, it requires the trustee or debtor-inpossession to cure all past defaults and to offer adequate
assurance of future performance.
Rejection allows the
bankrupt's estate to avoid those requirements and limits the
non-bankrupt obligee to an unsecured claim for breach of
contract. After rejection, the performance of the nonbankrupt obligee is excused.
780 F. 2d. at 1486. (Emphasis added).
8

By this statement the 9th Circuit confirmed an earlier legal conclusion in the case
of In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F. 2d. 1339 (9th Cir. 1983). The first portion
of the court's ruling was unremarkable: failure of the debtor's bankruptcy trustee to
timely assume executory contracts for the sale of land resulted in rejection of the
contracts by operation of law. However, the 9th Circuit then went on to rule that the
breach caused by the automatic rejection relieved the nondebtor parties of their
obligations under the contracts as of the date of breach. 703 F. 2d. at 1353. Clearly,
the 9th Circuit does not view the breach resulting from rejection as merely a claims
mechanism. Rather, the breach of a contract occasioned by the operation of Section
365(d)(1) and 365(g)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code results in a termination of the contract
such that it may not be enforced against the nondebtor party.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion regarding the effect of rejection
on the rights of the parties. In Waldschmidt vs. Metropolitan Lincoln/Mercury, Inc., 53
B.R. 589 (Bankr. N.D. Tenn. 1985) the Chapter 7 trustee of an individual debtor failed
to timely assume the debtor's executory contract whereby the nondebtor party had agreed
to supply vehicles to the debtor at an attractive price.

The court first cited the

legislative history of Section 365 for the proposition that Section 365(d) was intended to
prevent parties in contractual relationships with the debtor from being left in doubt
concerning the status of the contract. 53 B.R. at 590 (citing S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 59 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, pp. 5787, 5845). The court
then held that after rejection the trustee was barred from enforcing the nondebtor's
promise to provide vehicles under the contract.

Contrary to Cobabe's arguments the

breach arising from the rejection of the consulting agreement terminated the contract
9

and did not simply trigger the Stangers' right to file a claim in Cobabe's bankruptcy
case.
It is also clear that Cobabe may not selectively enforce against the Stangers those
portions of the consulting agreement that are of benefit to Cobabe. In In re Auto Dealer
Services, Inc., 65 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1986) the debtor, a warranty service
agreement provider, filed suit against various auto dealers to enforce a provision of a
contract that required the dealers to refund to the debtor an advance commission upon
cancellation of certain service agreements. The court first determined that the service
and dealer agreements had been rejected pursuant to the provisions of Section 365.
While noting that the refund provision of the contracts may have been enforceable under
state law, the court found that the operation of Section 365 required a different result.
In denying the debtor's attempt to enforce the refund provisions of the contracts, the
court concluded that rejection of the contracts resulted in a breach sufficient to release
the nondebtor parties of any liability under the contracts. 65 B.R. at 684. To similar
effect, the court in In re Silk Plants, etc. Franchise Systems, Inc., 100 B.R. 360 (Bankr.
N.D. Tenn. 1989) determined that rejection of the subject contract meant termination of
the entire contract, including nonmonetary provisions regarding the debtor's covenant not
to compete against the nondebtor party.
As stated previously, Cobabe's contention that personal service contracts are
somehow exempt from the operation of Section 365 is supported neither by the statute
nor interpretive case law. Under Section 365, a trustee may reject (either by direct
action or by failure to act) all executory contracts - including personal service contracts.
Taylor, 913 F.2d. at 106. The position of the federal courts with regard to the effect of
rejection of a personal service contract was made clear in In re Calder, 94 B.R. 200
10

(Bankr. D. Utah 1988).

In the course of an opinion discussing the rejection of the

debtor/attorney's personal service contracts with his clients, Judge John H. Allen of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah stated that "a debtor filing a
chapter 7 liquidation case automatically severs a personal service contract". 94 B.R. at
203. Although Judge Allen's statement was, admittedly, not central to his decision in
Calder, it must be viewed by this Court as a reliable indicator of how the federal
judiciary views the issue at hand.
As support for his argument that the lower court erred in concluding that the
Agreement could not be enforced against the Stangers, Cobabe cites two dated cases
(both of which are clearly distinguishable from the facts at hand) as well as a scholarly,
though unpersuasive, law review article. First, Cobabe's reliance on Matter of Garfinkle,
577 F.2d. 901 (5th Cir. 1978), is misplaced. That case involved a bankruptcy trustee who
had succeeded to the interests of an individual who was both the lessee and the lessor
of a piece of real property subject to a 999 year lease. The trustee, appointed under
Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, sought to reject the lease in order to
destroy a creditor's security interest. In an effort to prevent this perceived injustice the
5th Circuit obviously confused the concept of rejection with that of abandonment.
Garfinkle, 577 F.2d. at 904. The court's conclusion that the debtor/lessee's interest in
the leasehold was not destroyed upon rejection is in direct contradiction of later cases
under the Code holding that rejection of nonresidential leases terminates the entire
lease, including any lien on the leasehold interest. In re Giles Associates, Ltd., 92 B.R.
695 (Bankr. W.D. Tx. 1988); In re Gillis, 92 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Ha. 1988).
Next, and upon closer reading,, Cobabe's reliance on the case of In re Knight, 8
B.R. 925 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) is inappropriate given the fact that the Knight court
11

expressly limited its decision to the context of a residential lease where the debtor is a
consumer tenant. Knight, 8 B.R. at 929. Notwithstanding this express limitation the
equitable result reached in Knight has not been followed by other courts.
Finally, Cobabe acknowledges Professor Michael T. Andrew's law review article
for its analysis of Section 365 and its conclusion that everyone else who has reviewed the
issue has misunderstood it. (Cobabe Brief, p. 18). The lower court, while acknowledging Professor Andrew's thoughtful coverage of the issue, properly declined the interpretation of the statute urged by Cobabe and instead concluded that the Agreement should
be viewed as terminated in light of the federal court decisions cited above. In view of
the fact that no federal court has followed Professor Andrew's approach in the three
years since publication of his article, the Stangers urge this Court to place primary
reliance on the statute, and federal decisions interpreting the statute, in deciding the
issue before it.

Such an analysis will compel the conclusion that rejection of the

Agreement resulted in a breach sufficient to bar enforcement of the contract against the
Stangers.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the decision of the lower
court.
DATED this 14th day of August, 1991.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Bv: (Of3/^^

Joel T. Marker
Attorneys for Garth Stanger and
Edward Stanger
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
H. LeROY COBABE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 90-0503248
Judge J. Philip Eves

GARTH STANGER and
EDWARD STANGER,
Defendants.
JUDGMENT

Pursuant to this Court's Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and Granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated January ^ ^ , 1991, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff H. LeRoy Cobabe's Complaint, dated April 20, 1990, is hereby

dismissed with prejudice; and
Ci^

•MJ, \'

v

r

2.

Defendants Garth Stanger and Edward Stanger are hereby granted judgment

against H. LeRoy Cobabe, pursuant to their Counterclaim, in the amount of $20,000.00,

together with prejudgment interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per year
from May 25, 1990 to the date of this Judgment, each party to bear their own costs and
attorney's fees in this proceeding.
DATED this ^f^flay of January, 1991.
BY THE COURT
J^Phillip'Eves,
district Court (fridge
STANGAll
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TabB

Title 11

CASE ADMINISTRATION

Subsection (d) grants the court the authority to authorize the obtaining of credit and the
incurring of debt with a superiority, that is a
lien on encumbered property that is senior or
equal to the existing lien on the property.
The court may authorize such a super-priority
only if the trustee is otherwise unable to obtain credit, and if there is adequate protection
of the original lien holder's interest. Again,
the trustee has the burden of proof on the
issue of adequate protection.
Subsection (e) provides the same protection
for credit extenders pending an appeal of an
authorization to incur debt as is provided under section 363(/) for purchasers: the credit is
not affected on appeal by reversal of the authorization and the incurring of the debt were
stayed pending appeal. The protection runs
to a good faith lender, whether or not he knew
of the pendency of the appeal.
A claim arising as a result of lending or
borrowing under this section will be a priority
claim, as defined in proposed section 507(aXl),
even if the claim is granted a super-priority
over administrative expenses and is to be paid
in advance of other first priority claims.
Legislative Statements. Section 364(f) of
the House amendment is new. This provision
continues the exemption found in section 3(a)
(7) of the Securities Act of 1933 [section 77c(a)
(7) of Title 15, Commerce and Trade] for certif-

§ 365

icates of indebtedness issued by a trustee in
bankruptcy. The exemption applies to any
debt security issued under section 364 of title
11. The section does not intend to change
present law which exempts such securities
from the Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C.
77aaa, et seq. (1976) [section 77aaa et seq. of
Title 15].
References in Text. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, referred to in subsec. (f),
is classified to section 77e of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, referred to
in subsec. (f), is Title III of Act May 27, 1933,
c. 38, as added Aug. 3, 1939, c. 411, 43 Stat.
1149, which is classified to section 77aaa et
seq. of Title 15.
Effective Date of 1986 Amendments;
Savings Provisions; Quarterly Fees.
Amendment by Pub.L. 99-554 effective 30
days after Oct. 27, 1986, except as otherwise
provided for, see section 302(a) of Pub.L. 99554, set out as a note under section 581 of
Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Amendments by Pub.L. 99-554, § 257(/), not
to apply with respect to cases commenced
under Title 11, Bankruptcy, before 30 days
after Oct. 27,1986, see section 302(cXD of Pub.
L. 99-554, set out as a note under section 581
of Title 28.

Cross References

Applicability of subsecs. (c) to (f) of this section in chapter 9 cases, see section 901.
Priorities, see section 507.
Reversal on appeal of finding of jurisdiction as affecting validity of debt incurred, see
section 921.
Rights and powers of debtor engaged in business, see section 1304.
Library References:

C.J.S. Bankruptcy §§ 200-202.
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy e=»3035-3038.
WESTLAW Electronic Research

See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights.

§ 3 6 5 . Executory contracts and unexpired leases
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
(bXD If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the
time of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee—
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or
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lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such
default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a
breach of a provision relating to—
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time
before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under
this title or a custodian before such commencement.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and paragraph (2)(B)
of subsection (f), adequate assurance of future performance of a lease of real
property in a shopping center includes adequate assurance—
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due under such lease,
and in the case of an assignment, that the financial condition and operating
performance of the proposed assignee and its guarantors, if any, shall be
similar to the financial condition and operating performance of the debtor
and its guarantors, if any, as of the time the debtor became the lessee under
the lease;
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease will not decline
substantially;
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is subject to all the
provisions thereof, including (but not limited to) provisions such as a radius,
location, use, or exclusivity provision, and will not breach any such provision
contained in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement
relating to such shopping center; and
(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt any
tenant mix or balance in such shopping center.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if there has been a
default in an unexpired lease of the debtor, other than a default of a kind
specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the trustee may not require a lessor
to provide services or supplies incidental to such lease before assumption of such
lease unless the lessor is compensated under the terms of such lease for any
services and supplies provided under such lease before assumption of such lease.
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession whether
or not such contract, or lease, prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or
delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment; or
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or
to issue a security of the debtor; or
(3) such lease is of nonresidential real property and has been terminated under applicable nonbankruptcy law prior to the order for relief.
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(d)(1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume o:r
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real property or of
personal property of the debtor within 60 days after the order for relief, or
within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period,
fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected
(2) In a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the trustee may
assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real
property or of personal property of the debtor at any time before the confirmation of a plan but the court, on the request of any party to such contract or lease,
may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time whether to
assume or reject such contract or lease
(3) The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except
those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief
under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is
assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(bXD of this title. The court
may extend, for cause, the time for performance of any such obligation that
arises within 60 days after the date of the order for relief, but the time for
performance shall not be extended beyond such 60-day period. This subsection
shall not be deemed to affect the trustee's obligations under the provisions of
subsection (b) or (f) of this section. Acceptance of any such performance does not
constitute waiver or 'relinquishment of the lessor's rights under such lease or
under this title.
(4) Notwithstanding paragraphs (I) and (2), in a case undei airy chapter of
this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days
after the date of the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court,
for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected,
and the trustee shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to
the lessor.
(e)(1) Notwithstanding « ^icwsiw*. ..
...,.
^ . i . r a u or unexpired
lease, or in applicable law, an executory o-<
~ ^ or unexpired lease of the debtor
may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such
contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the
commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease
that is conditioned on
(A) t h e inso 1 vency or tmanciJ 1
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before the closing of the case;

(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under
this title or a custodian before such commencement.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits
or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—
(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee or to an assignee of such contract or lease, whether or
"- '• •-, \ contract or lease prohibits • restricts assignment of .ights or
«* -tei.;: \ . of d u t i e s ,
""^
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(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or
to issue a security of the debtor.
(f)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding a
provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in
applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such
contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under paragraph
(2) of this subsection.
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor only if—
(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with the
provisions of this section; and
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such
contract or lease is provided, whether or not there has been a default in such
contract or lease.
(3) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor, or in applicable law that terminates or modifies, or permits a party
other than the debtor to terminate or modify, such contract or lease or a right or
obligation under such contract or lease on account of an assignment of such
contract or lease, such contract, lease, right, or obligation may not be terminated
or modified under such provision because of the assumption or assignment of
such contract or lease by the trustee.
(g) Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the
rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a
breach of such contract or lease—
(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this section or
under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, immediately before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(2) if such contract or lease has been assumed under this section or
under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title—
(A) if before such rejection the case has not been converted under
section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title, at the time of such rejection; or
(B) if before such rejection the case has been converted under
section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title—
(i) immediately before the date of such conversion, if such
contract or lease was assumed before such conversion; or
(ii) at the time of such rejection, if such contract or lease was
assumed after such conversion.
(hXD If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor
under which the debtor is the lessor, or a timeshare interest under a timeshare
plan under which the debtor is the timeshare interest seller, the lessee or
timeshare interest purchaser under such lease or timeshare plan may treat such
lease or timeshare plan as terminated by such rejection, where the disaffirmance
by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the lessee or timeshare
interest purchaser to treat such lease or timeshare plan as terminated by virtue
of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or other agreements the lessee
or timeshare interest purchaser has made with other parties; or, in the alternative, the lessee or timeshare interest purchaser may remain in possession of the
leasehold or timeshare interest under any lease or timeshare plan the term of
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which has commenced for the balance of such term and for any renewal or
extension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee or timeshare interest
purchaser under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser remains in possession as
provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, such lessee or timeshare interest
purchaser may offset against the rent reserved under such lease or moneys due
for such timeshare interest for the balance of the term after the date of the
rejection of such lease or timeshare interest, and any such renewal or extension
thereof, any damages occurring after such date caused by the nonperformance of
any obligation of the debtor under such lease or timeshare plan after such date,
but such lessee or timeshare interest purchaser does not have any rights against
the estate on account of any damages arising after such date from such rejection,
other than such offset.
(i)(l) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale of
real property or for the sale of a timeshare interest under a timeshare plan,
under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such
contract as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession of such
real property or timeshare interest.
(2) If such purchaser remains in possession—
(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due under such
contract, but may, offset against such payments any damages occurring after
the date of the rejection of such contract caused by the nonperformance of
any obligation. of the debtor after such date, but such purchaser does not
have any rights against the estate on account of amy damages arising after
such date from such rejection, other than such offset; and
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in accordance with
the provisions of such contract, but is relieved of all other obligations to
perform under such contract.
(j) A purchaser that treats an executory contract as terminated under
subsection (i) of this section, or a party whose executory contract to purchase
real property from the debtor is rejected and under which such party is not in
possession, has a lien on the interest of the debtor in such property for the
recovery of any portion of the purchase price that such purchaser or party has
paid.
(k) Assignment by the trustee to an entity of a contract or lease assumed
under this section relieves the trustee and the estate from any liability for any
breach of such contract or lease occurring after such assignment.
(/) If an unexpired lease under which the debtor is the lessee is assigned
pursuant to this section, the lessor of the property may require a deposit or other
security for the performance of the debtor's obligations under the lease substantially the same as would have been required by the landlord upon the initial
leasing to a similar tenant.
(m) For purposes of this section 365 and sections 541(b)(2) and 362(b)(10),
leases of real property shall include any rental agreement to use real property.
(n)(l) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a
licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract may
elect—
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such
rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the
licensee to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms,
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applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee with
another entity; or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under applicable
nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract) under such
contract and under any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such
intellectual property (including any embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law), as such rights
existed immediately before the case commenced, for—
(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the
licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph (1)(B)
of this subsection, under such contract—
(A) the trustee shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights;
(B) the licensee shall make all royalty payments due under such contract for the duration of such contract and for any period described in
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection for which the licensee extends such
contract; and
(C) the licensee shall be deemed to waive—
(i) any right of setoff it may have with respect to such contract
under this title or applicable nonbankruptcy law; and
(ii) any claim allowable under section 503(b) of this title arising
from the performance of such contract.
(3) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph (1)(B)
of this subsection, then on the written request of the licensee the trustee shall—
(A) to the extent provided in such contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, provide to the licensee any intellectual property
(including such embodiment) held by the trustee; and
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such
contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including such embodiment) including any right to obtain
such intellectual property (or such embodiment) from another entity.
(4) Unless and until the trustee rejects such contract, on the written request
of the licensee the trustee shall—
(A) to the extent provided in such contract or any agreement supplementary to such contract—
(i) perform such contract; or
(ii) provide to the licensee such intellectual property (including any
embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by
applicable nonbankruptcy law) held by the trustee; and
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such
contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including such embodiment), including any right to obtain
such intellectual property (or such embodiment) from another entity.
(o) In a case under chapter 11 of this title, the trustee shall be deemed to
have assumed (consistent with the debtor's other obligations under section 507),
and shall immediately cure any deficit under, any commitment by the debtor to
110

Title 11

CASE ADMINISTRATION

§ 365

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation,
the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the Currency,
or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or its predecessors or
successors, to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution, and any
claim for a subsequent breach of the obligations thereunder shall be entitled to
priority under section 507. This subsection shall not extend any commitment
that would otherwise be terminated by any act of such an agency.
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2574; Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, §§ 362, 402404, July 10,1984, 98 Stat. 361, 367; Pub.L. 99-554, Title II, §§ 2570*), (m), 283(e),
Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3115, 3117; Pub.L. 100-506, § 1(b), Oct. 18, 1988, 102
Stat. 2538; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXV, § 2522(c), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4866.
Historical and Revision Notes
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary,
Senate Report No. 95-989. Subsection (a) of
this section authorizes the trustee, subject to
the court's approval, to assume or reject an
executory contract or unexpired lease.
Though there is no precise definition of what
contracts are executory, it generally includes
contracts on which performance remains due
to some extent on both sides. A note is not
usually an executory contract if the only performance that remains is repayment. Performance on one side of the contract would
have been completed and the contract is no
longer executory.
Because of the volatile nature of the commodities markets and the special provisions
governing commodity broker liquidations in
subchapter IV of chapter 7, the provisions
governing distribution in section 765(a) will
govern if any conflict between those provisions and the provisions of this section arise.
Subsections (b), (c) and (d) provide limitations on the trustee's powers. Subsection (b)
requires the trustee to cure any default in the
contract or lease and to provide adequate assurance of future performance if there has
been a default, before he may assume. This
provision does not apply to defaults under ipso
facto or bankruptcy clauses, which is a significant departure from present law.
Subsection (b)(3) permits termination of
leases entered into prior to the effective date
of this title in liquidation cases if certain
other conditions are met.
Subsection (bX4) prohibits the trustee's assumption of an executory contract requiring
the other party to make a loan or deliver
equipment to or to issue a security of the
debtor. The purpose of this subsection is to
make it clear that a party to a transaction
which is based upon the financial strength of
a debtor should not be required to extend new
credit to the debtor whether in the form of

loans, lease financing, or the purchase or discount of notes.
Subsection (bX5) provides that in lease situations common to shopping centers, protections
must be provided for the lessor if the trustee
assumes the lease, including protection
against decline in percentage rents, breach of
agreements with other tenants, and preservation of the tenant mix. Protection for tenant
mix will not be required in the office building
situation.
Subsection (c) prohibits the trustee from assuming or assigning a contract or lease if
applicable nonbankruptcy law excuses the
other party from performance to someone other than the debtor, unless the other party
consents. This prohibition applies only in the
situation in which applicable law excuses the
other party from performance independent of
any restrictive language in the contract or
lease itself.
Subsection (d) places time limits on assumption and rejection. In a liquidation case, the
trustee must assume within 60 days (or within
an additional 60 days, if the court, for cause,
extends the time). If not assumed, the contract or lease is deemed rejected. In a rehabilitation case, the time limit is not fixed in
the bill. However, if the other party to the
contract or lease requests the court to fix a
time, the court may specify a time within
which the trustee must act. This provision
will prevent parties in contractual or lease
relationships with the debtor from being left
in doubt concerning their status vis-a-vis the
estate.
Subsection (e) invalidates ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses. These clauses, protected under present law, automatically terminate the
contract or lease, or permit the other contracting party to terminate the contract or
lease, in the event of bankruptcy. This frequently hampers rehabilitation efforts. If the
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trustee may assume or assign the contract
under the limitations imposed by the remainder of the section, the contract or lease may
be utilized to assist in the debtor's rehabilitation or liquidation.
The unenforcibility of ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses proposed under this section will
require the courts to be sensitive to the rights
of the nondebtor party to executory contracts
and unexpired leases. If the trustee is to
assume a contract or lease, the court will have
to insure that the trustee's performance under
the contract or lease gives the other contracting party the full benefit of his bargain.
This subsection does not limit the application of an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause if a
new insolvency or receivership occurs after
the bankruptcy case is closed. That is, the
clause is not invalidated in toto, but merely
made inapplicable during the case for the
purposes of disposition of the executory contract or unexpired lease.
Subsection (f) partially invalidates restrictions on assignment of contracts or leases by
the trustee to a third party. The subsection
imposes two restrictions on the trustee: he
must first assume the contract or lease, subject to all the restrictions on assumption
found in the section, and adequate assurance
of future performance must be provided to the
other contracting party. Paragraph (3) of the
subsection invalidates contractual provisions
that permit termination or modification in the
event of an assignment, as contrary to the
policy of this subsection.
Subsection (g) defines the time as of which a
rejection of an executory contract or
unexpired lease constitutes a breach of the
contract or lease. Generally, the breach is as
of the date immediately preceding the date of
the petition. The purpose is to treat rejection
claims as prepetition claims. The remainder
of the subsection specifies different times for
cases that are converted from one chapter to
another. The provisions of this subsection are
not a substantive authorization to breach or
reject an assumed contract. Rather, they prescribe the rules for the allowance of claims in
case an assumed contract is breached, or if a
case under chapter 11 in which a contract has
been assumed is converted to a case under
chapter 7 in which the contract is rejected.
Subsection (h) protects real property lessees
of the debtor if the trustee rejects an
unexpired lease under which the debtor is the
lessor (or sublessor). The subsection permits
the lessee to remain in possession of the
leased property or to treat the lease as terminated by the rejection. The balance of the
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term of the lease referred to in paragraph (1)
will include any renewal terms that are enforceable by the tenant, but not renewal terms
if the landlord had an option to terminate.
Thus, the tenant will not be deprived of his
estate for the term for which he bargained. If
the lessee remains in possession, he may offset
the rent reserved under the lease against
damages caused by the rejection, but does not
have any affirmative rights against the estate
for any damages after the rejection that result
from the rejection.
Subsection (i) gives a purchaser of real property under a land installment sales contract
similar protection. The purchaser, if the contract is rejected, may remain in possession or
may treat the contract as terminated. If the
purchaser remains in possession, he is required to continue to make the payments due,
but may offset damages that occur after rejection. The trustee is required to deliver title,
but is relieved of all other obligations to perform.
A purchaser that treats the contract as terminated is granted a lien on the property to
the extent of the purchase price paid. A
party with a contract to purchase land from
the debtor has a lien on the property to secure
the price already paid, if the contract is rejected and the purchaser is not yet in possession.
Subsection (k) relieves the trustee and the
estate of liability for a breach of an assigned
contract or lease that occurs after the assignment.
Legislative Statements. Section 365(b)(3)
represents a compromise between H.R. 8200
as passed by the House and the Senate amendment. The provision adopts standards contained in section 365(b)(5) of the Senate
amendment to define adequate assurance of
future performance of a lease of real property
in a shopping center.
Section 365(bX4) of the House amendment
indicates that after default the trustee may
not require a lessor to supply services or
materials without assumption unless the lessor is compensated as provided in the lease.
Section 365<cX2) and (3) likewise represent a
compromise between H.R. 8200 as passed by
the House and the Senate amendment. Section 365XcX2) is derived from section 365(bX4)
of the Senate amendment but does not apply
to a contract to deliver equipment as provided
in the Senate amendment. As contained in
the House amendment, the provision prohibits
a trustee or debtor in possession from assuming or assigning an executory contract of the
debtor to make a loan, or extend other debt
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financing or financial accommodations, to or
for the benefit of the debtor, or the issuance of
a security of the debtor.
Section 365(e) is a refinement of comparable
provisions contained in the House bill and
Senate amendment. Sections 365(eXD and (2)
(A) restate section 365(e) of H.R. 8200 as
passed by the House. Sections 365(eX2XB) expands the section to permit termination of an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor if such contract is a contract to make a
loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of
the debtor, or for the issuance of a security of
the debtor.
Characterization of contracts to make a
loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, is limited to the extension of cash or a line of credit and is not
intended to embrace ordinary leases or contracts to provide goods or services with payments to be made over time.
Section 365(0 is derived from H.R. 8200 as
passed by the House. Deletion of language in
section 365(fX3) of the Senate amendment is
done as a matter of style. Restrictions with
respect to assignment of an executory contract
or unexpired lease are superfluous since the
debtor may assign an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor only if such
contract is first assumed under section 364(f)
(2XA) of the House amendment.
Section 363(h) of the House amendment represents a modification of section 365(h) of the
Senate amendment. The House amendment
makes clear that in the case of a bankrupt
lessor, a lessee may remain in possession for
the balance of the term of a lease and any
renewal or extension of the term only to the
extent that such renewal or extension may be
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obtained by the lessee without the permission
of the landlord or some third party under
applicable non-bankruptcy law.
Codification. Amendment to subsec. (cXD
(A) by Pub.L. 99-554, § 283(eXlX/), struck out
"or an assignee" as the probable intent of
Congress, notwithstanding language of amendment requiring "or and assignee" be struck
out.
Effective Date of 1988 Amendments; Application of Amendments. Amendment by
Pub.L. 100-506 effective Oct. 18,1988. and not
applicable to cases commenced before Oct. 18,
1988, see section 2 of Pub.L. 100-506, set out
as a note under section 101 of this title.
Effective Date of 1986 Amendments;
Savings Provisions; Quarterly Fees.
Amendment by Pub.L. 99-554 effective 30
days after Oct. 27, 1986, except as otherwise
provided for, see section 302(a) of Pub.L. 99554, set out as a note under section 581 of
Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Amendments by Pub.L. 99-554, § 2570'),
(m), not to apply with respect to cases commenced under Title 11, Bankruptcy, before 30
days after Oct. 27, 1986, see section 302(cXD of
Pub.L. 99-554, set out as a note under section
581 of Title 28.
Effective Date of 1984 Amendments. See
section 553 of Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, July 10,
1984, 98 Stat. 392, set out as an Effective Date
of 1984 Amendment note preceding chapter 1
of Title 11, Bankruptcy.
Separability of Provisions. For separability of provisions of Title III of Pub.L. 98353, see section 551 of Pub.L. 98-353 set out as
a Separability of Provisions note preceding
chapter 1 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.

Cross References
Allowance of claims, see section 502.
Applicability of this section in chapter 9 cases, see section 901.
Assumption or rejection of certain executory contracts within reasonable time after
order for relief, see section 744.
Collective bargaining agreements, see section 1167.
Effect of rejection of lease of railroad line, see section 1169.
Impairment of claims or interests by plans which cure certain defaults, see section
1124.
Provisions in plan for assumption or rejection of certain executory contracts or
unexpired leases, see sections 1123 and 1322.
Right of possession of party with security interest as affected by default
Aircraft equipment and vessels, see section 1110.
Rolling stock equipment, see section 1168.
Setoff, see section 553.
Library References:
C.J.S. Bankruptcy §§ 108, 117, 216-230.
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy <5»3101 et seq.
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IN THE DISTPICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
H. LeROY CCBABE,
Plaintiff,

1

MEMORANDUM DECISION

1

Civil No. 900503248

vs.
GARTH STANGER and
EDWARD STANGER,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on October 18, 1990,
the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, en cross Motions for
Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiffs were represented by Carolyn

Montgomery, their attorney of record and the Defendants by Joel T.
Marker, their attorney of record.

The Court heard extensive oral

argument and then took the matter under submission.

The Court has

now reviewed the file in its entirety including the article
entitled Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy? Understanding
"Re jection,f, by Michael T. Andrew which was submitted by Plaintiff
and the copies of statutes and cases cited in opposition to the
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by counsel for
the defense.

The Court being fully advised in the premises now

enters the following Decision and Order.

This case places this Court in a rather unusual position
of being required to decide a hotly disputed issue of Federal
Bankruptcy Law which is really the only legal issue presented by
either side in their Motions for Summary Judgment.
explanation of the facts would appear appropriate.

A brief
These are the

fa'cts to which the parties have agreed there is no dispute.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
On or about April 26th, 1988, the parties entered into
an agreement for consulting services, (the agreement), wherein the
Plaintiff agreed to act as consultant for the Defendants who were
purchasing a Toyota dealership from the Plaintiff.

The agreement

contained provisions for compensation to the Plaintiff from the
Defendants.

Both sides kept up their obligations under the

agreement through the month of October, 1989.

On November 1,

1989, the Plaintiff filed bankruptcy in response to a Writ of
Garnishment which was served on the Defendants by a prevailing
party in another lawsuit with the Plaintiff therein seeking to
garnish the payments due from these Defendants to this Plaintiff.
Thereafter, these Defendants refused to make any more payments
under the agreement with this Plaintiff and the matter wound up
before the Federal Bankruptcy Court on a Motion to determine the
validity of the garnishment.

After hearing, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the
garnishment had no validity as it was attempting to garnish
post-petition earnings.

The Bankruptcy Court ordered the

Defendants to pay to this Plaintiff some $20,000.00 in overdue
payments under the agreement or to be found in contempt of court
wicn stated penalties.

A payment of $20,300.00 was made to

Plaintiff by Defendants under that order.
Thereafter, on stipulation of both sides, the Order of
the Bankruptcy Court was vacated and the enforcement of the
consulting agreement between this Plaintiff and these Defendants
became the subject of a Complaint before this Court on April 23,
1990.

The Plaintifffs Complaint states simply that there is an

agreement between himself and the Defendants, that he is entitled
to payment under that agreement, that the Defendants have failed
and refused to pay as required under the agreement.

The Plaintiff

seeks Judgment for the amounts due under the agreement.

To that

Complaint the Defendants have filed an Answer and asserted a
Counterclaim.

The issue raised by the Answer and Counterclaim is

the issue which this Court must resolve in this decision, mainly
whether or not the agreement between the parties has any further
force or effect between these Darties.

The parties agree for purposes of this decision that the
agreement is in fact an executory contract within the meaning of
the bankruptcy laws, that is was not assumed within 60 days of the
petition date by the trustee in bankruptcy, that by operation of
law the nonassumption meant that the contract had teen rejected by
the trustee in bankruptcy, and that the Bankruptcy Court did not
rule on the issue of the effect of that rejection upon the rights
and obligations of these parties to the contract, under 11 U.S.C.,
Section 365 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
LEGAL ISSUE
The issue upon which the resolution of these Motions for
Summary Judgment turns is the effect of the rejection of the
executory contract by the trustee in bankruptcy.

Plaintiff

contends that such a rejection is merely a decision by the
bankruptcy trustee not to include the executory contract as an
asset (with a corresponding liability) in the estate of the
bankrupt.

Plaintiff contends further that the effect of the

rejection by the trustee is simply to leave the parties in the
position they were in prior to the rejection and thus seeks to
enforce the agreement.

Plaintiff contends he remains ready,

willing and able to perform consulting services and has never

breached the agreement.

Defendants contend that the rejection by

the trustee in bankruptcy has the effect, as a natter of law, of
terminating their obligations to perform under the contract.
Defendants cite 11 U.S.C. Section 365 for the proposition that the
rejection by the trustee constitutes a breach of the contract and
ends their obligations and rights thereunder except their right to
file a claim for damages with the trustee.

They assert therefore

in their Answer and Counterclaim that the contract is of no
further force and effect and Plaintiff has no right to pursue.
payments under the agreement.
ANALYSIS
In support of Plaintiff's position counsel has referred
the Court to several cases and to the article by Michael T. Andrew
referred to above.

None of the cases appear dispositive of the

issue as it is apparent by the cases cited by the parties as well
as the cases cited by Mr. Andrew in his article that there is a
longstanding dispute among the Federal Judges as to the exact
effect of a rejection of an executory contract by a trustee in
bankruptcy.

Mr. Andrew, and the Plaintiff, contend the Federal

Courts has erred in their interpretation of 11 U.S.C, 365.
are cases cited by both sides which appear to support their

There

respective positions to some extent.

None of the cases cited

appear to be factually similar to this case.

(See In Re Knight, 8

B.R. 925 [1981] and In Re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2nd
1339 [1983]).
The Court is substantially persuaded by the article by
Mr. Andrew cited hereinabove that the doctrine of rejection of an
executory contract by a trustee did not originally include the
concept that the debtor and the non-debtor party to the contract
would have their rights and liabilities thereunder automatically
terminated by the rejection.

The Court is further substantially

persuaded that it was not the original intent to the Courts
involved in the development of the concept of rejection that the
statutory breach language contained in the present bankruptcy code
would somehow operate to terminate those rights and liabilities.
In fact, the arguments and policy considerations stated by Mr.
Andrew appear to make perfect sense to this Court.

However, this

Court is obligated to apply Federal Bankruptcy Law as it has been
interpreted by the Federal Courts to the best of its ability
rather than to apply a novel interpretation of that law in this
case.

This does not appear to be a case of first impression and

therefore this Court must follow Federal decisions.
In two cases the Federal Courts have apparently held
that rejection of an executory contract by a trustee in bankruptcy
has the effect of terminating the liabilities under the contract .

excusing any further performance by the non-debtor party.
(See In Re Cochise College Park , Inc., 703 F.2nd 1339, 1353 [9th
Circuit 1983] and In Re Pacific Express, Inc., 780 F.2nd 1482,
1486, footnote 3 [9th Circuit 1986]).

In addition, several

Federal decisions have held that similar language relating to
leasehold interests means that the lease is terminated if the
lease is rejected by the bankruptcy trustee.

These latter

authorities are less persuasive on the issue before this Court in
view of the additional language contained in that statute which
seems to provide that if the rejection occurs the debtor must
immediately return possession of the property to the landlord.
(See 11 U.S.C. Section 365 (d)(4).)
It is apparent to this Court in analyzing the
authorities that although Mr. Andrew may have a superior
intellectual position as demonstrated by his article, the Federal
Courts have not followed his logic in applying the statute and
have indeed followed the rule that rejection by the trustee
results in a termination of all future rights and liabilities both
of the debtor and of the non-debtor in an executory contract.
This Court feels constrained to follow that authority.

It is hereby Ordered therefore that the Motion for
Summary Judgment of the Defendants is GRANTED and the Motion for
Summary Judgment of the Plaintiff is DENIED.

Counsel for the

Defendants is to prepare and submit Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and an appropriate Judgment for the Court's consideration
and signature.
The Court hereby certifies this decision under U.F.C.P.
54(b) as final for the purpose of allowing appropriate appellate
review.

Counsel for the Defendants is to include this

certification in the documents submitted in accordance herewith.
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Carolyn Montgomery, Eso.
P. 0. Box 45340
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